UIdaho Law

Digital Commons @ UIdaho Law
Not Reported

Idaho Supreme Court Records & Briefs

5-21-2018

Timpson v. State Respondent's Brief Dckt. 45427

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.uidaho.edu/not_reported

Recommended Citation
"Timpson v. State Respondent's Brief Dckt. 45427" (2018). Not Reported. 4492.
https://digitalcommons.law.uidaho.edu/not_reported/4492

This Court Document is brought to you for free and open access by the Idaho Supreme Court Records & Briefs at
Digital Commons @ UIdaho Law. It has been accepted for inclusion in Not Reported by an authorized administrator
of Digital Commons @ UIdaho Law. For more information, please contact annablaine@uidaho.edu.

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO

BRANDON JACK TIMPSON,

)
) No. 45427
)
Petitioner-Appellant,
) Ada County Case No.
) CV01-16-23508
v.
)
STATE OF IDAHO,
)
)
Defendant-Respondent.
)
)
________________________
BRIEF OF RESPONDENT
________________________
APPEAL FROM THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL
DISTRICT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE
COUNTY OF ADA
________________________
HONORABLE STEVEN J. HIPPLER
District Judge
________________________

LAWRENCE G. WASDEN
Attorney General
State of Idaho
PAUL R. PANTHER
Deputy Attorney General
Chief, Criminal Law Division

REED P. ANDERSON
Deputy State Appellate Public Defender
322 E. Front St., Ste. 570
Boise, Idaho 83702
(208) 334-2712

KENNETH K. JORGENSEN
Deputy Attorney General
Criminal Law Division
P. O. Box 83720
Boise, Idaho 83720-0010
(208) 334-4534
ATTORNEYS FOR
DEFENDANT-RESPONDENT

ATTORNEY FOR
PETITIONER-APPELLANT

TABLE OF CONTENTS
PAGE
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES .............................................................................................. ii
STATEMENT OF THE CASE............................................................................................1
Nature Of The Case .................................................................................................1
Statement Of The Facts And Course Of The Proceedings ......................................1
ISSUE ..................................................................................................................................3
ARGUMENT .......................................................................................................................4
Timpson Has Failed To Show That He Presented A Prima Facie Claim
Of Ineffective Assistance Of Counsel For Not Filing A Rule 35 Motion ...............4
A.

Introduction ..................................................................................................4

B.

Standard Of Review .....................................................................................4

C.

The District Court Correctly Dismissed Timpson’s Claim Of
Ineffective Assistance Of Counsel For Not Filing A Rule 35
Motion ..........................................................................................................5

CONCLUSION ....................................................................................................................9
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE ............................................................................................9

i

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
CASES

PAGE

Coleman v. Alabama, 399 U.S. 1 (1970) ............................................................................ 7
Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U.S. 722 (1991) ..................................................................... 7
Estrada v. State, 143 Idaho 558, 149 P.3d 833 (2006)........................................................ 7
Gilpin-Grubb v. State, 138 Idaho 76, 57 P.3d 787 (2002) .................................................. 5
Lawrence v. Florida, 549 U.S. 327 (2007) ......................................................................... 7
Murphy v. State, 156 Idaho 389, 327 P.3d 365 (2014)....................................................... 7
Pennsylvania v. Finley, 481 U.S. 551 (1987) ..................................................................... 7
Pratt v. State, 134 Idaho 581, 6 P.3d 831 (2000) ................................................................ 5
Schoger v. State, 148 Idaho 622, 226 P.3d 1269 (2010) ................................................ 5, 7
State v. Charboneau, 116 Idaho 129, 774 P.2d 299 (1989) ................................................ 5
State v. Dunlap, 155 Idaho 345, 313 P.3d 1 (2013) ............................................................ 7
State v. Hairston, 133 Idaho 496, 988 P.2d 1170 (1999) ................................................ 5, 7
State v. Hartshorn, 149 Idaho 454, 235 P.3d 404 (Ct. App. 2010) ..................................... 8
State v. Lovelace, 140 Idaho 53, 90 P.3d 278 (2003) ......................................................... 5
State v. Ruth, 102 Idaho 638, 637 P.2d 415 (1981) ............................................................ 7
State v. Smith, 161 Idaho 162, 384 P.3d 409 (Ct. App. 2016) ........................................... 8
State v. Wade, 125 Idaho 522, 873 P.2d 167 (Ct. App. 1994)............................................ 8
Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984) ................................................................. 5
United States v. Jackson, 923 F.2d 1494 (11th Cir. 1991) ................................................. 8
United States v. Paloma, 80 F.3d 138 (5th Cir. 1996) ........................................................ 8
United States v. Taylor, 414 F.3d 528 (4th Cir. 2005) ....................................................... 8
United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218 (1967) ...................................................................... 7
ii

Wainwright v. Torna, 455 U.S. 586 (1982) ........................................................................ 8
Workman v. State, 144 Idaho 518, 164 P.3d 798 (2007).................................................... 5
STATUTES
I.C. § 19-4906 ..................................................................................................................... 5
RULES
I.C.R. 35 ..................................................................................................................... passim
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS
U.S. Const. amend. VI ............................................................................................ 4, 7, 8, 9

iii

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature Of The Case
Brandon Jack Timpson appeals from the summary dismissal of his petition for postconviction relief.

Statement Of The Facts And Course Of The Proceedings
Timpson filed a petition for post-conviction relief from his convictions and
concurrent sentences of 25 years with six years determinate for robbery and seven years
with two years determinate for possession of a controlled substance. (R., pp. 5-10, 61-65,
67.) One of his claims was that his counsel was ineffective for not filing a Rule 35 motion
seeking reduction of sentence. (R., pp. 8-9, 62, 64.) He supported this claim with an
affidavit from his mother stating she contacted counsel and requested he file a Rule 35
motion, which was not done, and a contemporary letter from counsel acknowledging
Timpson’s interest in filing a Rule 35 motion, explaining the legal standards surrounding
such a motion (including the requirement of new evidence), and requesting that Timpson
provide any new evidence he had to support the motion. (R., pp. 15-17.)
The district court filed a notice of intent to dismiss the petition. (R., pp. 67-80.)
The district court indicated it would dismiss the claim of ineffective assistance of counsel
for not filing a Rule 35 motion because Timpson did not allege he had or could have
provided any “new evidence” to support the motion. (R., pp. 78-79.) Timpson, through
counsel, filed a reply to the notice asserting he “sent an email” to his attorney’s investigator
explaining that he had been “granted a trustee position at the prison and was working full
time as a painter and dry wall worker,” that the “length of the sentence made him ineligible
for programming,” that he “had a full time job awaiting him in both Utah and Idaho,” and
1

that he had “severe health issues [that] would be better treated in the community.” (R., pp.
81-82.) Attached to the reply is a certificate of verification signed by Timpson asserting
that the “foregoing amended petition” is “true and correct.” (R., p. 83.)
The district court summarily dismissed the petition. (R., pp. 85-100.) The court
dismissed the claim of ineffective assistance of counsel for not filing a Rule 35 motion
because it was not supported by admissible evidence and because the motion would not
have been granted. (R., pp. 98-99.)
The district court entered judgment (R., p. 101) and Timpson filed a timely notice
of appeal (R., pp. 103-04).
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ISSUE
Timpson states the issue on appeal as:
Did the district court err when it summarily dismissed Mr. Timpson’s postconviction petition?
(Appellant’s brief, p. 5.)
The state rephrases the issue as:
Has Timpson failed to show that he presented a prima facie claim of ineffective
assistance of counsel for not filing a Rule 35 motion?

3

ARGUMENT
Timpson Has Failed To Show That He Presented A Prima Facie Claim Of Ineffective
Assistance Of Counsel For Not Filing A Rule 35 Motion
A.

Introduction
The district court dismissed the claim that trial counsel was ineffective for not filing

a Rule 35 motion because (1) Timpson did not present evidence in support of his petition
and amended petition and, even though he claimed certain evidence in his reply, it was “not
properly verified” and (2) even if the evidence were considered the motion would not have
been granted. (R., pp. 98-99.) On appeal Timpson argues that the factual claims in the
reply are admissible evidence despite the errors in his verification and that the district court
applied an incorrect ineffective assistance of counsel standard. (Appellant’s brief, pp. 811.) Timpson’s claim that the faulty verification did not affect the admissibility of the
evidence fails because it would require this Court to make factual findings that Timpson
verified the claims in the reply. Timpson’s claim that the district court erred by dismissing
because the motion would not have been granted fails because it is well established in law
that it is neither deficient performance nor prejudicial to not file a motion that would not
have been granted. Alternatively, Timpson’s claim could also have been dismissed
because Timpson did not have a Sixth Amendment right to counsel to pursue a motion to
reconsider his sentence and therefore his claim of ineffective assistance of counsel fails as
a matter of law.

B.

Standard Of Review
When reviewing the summary dismissal of a post-conviction relief application, the

court “will determine whether a genuine issue of fact exists based on the pleadings,
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depositions and admissions together with any affidavits on file and will liberally construe
the facts and reasonable inferences in favor of the non-moving party.” Workman v. State,
144 Idaho 518, 523, 164 P.3d 798, 803 (2007) (citing Gilpin-Grubb v. State, 138 Idaho 76,
80, 57 P.3d 787, 791 (2002)). “When the alleged facts, even if true, would not entitle the
applicant to relief, the trial court may dismiss the application without holding an
evidentiary hearing.” Id.

C.

The District Court Correctly Dismissed Timpson’s Claim Of Ineffective Assistance
Of Counsel For Not Filing A Rule 35 Motion
Idaho Code § 19-4906 authorizes summary dismissal of an application for post-

conviction relief on the trial court’s own initiative or in response to a party’s motion. “To
withstand summary dismissal, a post-conviction applicant must present evidence
establishing a prima facie case as to each element of the claims upon which the applicant
bears the burden of proof.” State v. Lovelace, 140 Idaho 53, 72, 90 P.3d 278, 297 (2003)
(citing Pratt v. State, 134 Idaho 581, 583, 6 P.3d 831, 833 (2000)). A post-conviction
petitioner alleging ineffective assistance of counsel must demonstrate both deficient
performance and resulting prejudice. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687-88
(1984); State v. Charboneau, 116 Idaho 129, 137, 774 P.2d 299, 307 (1989). Where a
petitioner alleges trial counsel was ineffective for failing “to file or pursue certain motions,
a conclusion that the motion, if pursued, would not have been granted, is generally
determinative of both prongs of the Strickland test.” State v. Hairston, 133 Idaho 496, 512,
988 P.2d 1170, 1186 (1999), quoted in Schoger v. State, 148 Idaho 622, 630, 226 P.3d
1269, 1277 (2010).
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The district court concluded that Timpson had not presented admissible evidence
showing that a Rule 35 motion would have had merit. (R., p. 98.) This is accurate.
Timpson’s petitions assert Timpson and his mother requested counsel to file a Rule 35
motion, but provide no evidence that could have been submitted with the motion to
demonstrate its merit. (R., pp. 8-9, 15 (copy of letter from attorney requesting new
information), 16-17, 64.) The reply to the court’s notice of intent to dismiss claims that
Timpson sent an email to counsel’s investigator claiming he had become a trustee, could
not get programming because of the length of his sentence, had job opportunities, and was
sick. (R., pp. 81-82.) Attached to the reply is a certification, but of the “amended petition
and the documents, affidavits, and exhibits attached to this amended petition.” (R., p. 83;
see also R., p. 86 n.3 (district court noting that verification in reply verified only the
----information in the amended petition).)
Timpson argues that he did verify his reply, and the language in his verification
stating “amended petition” instead of “reply” is a “copy and paste error.” (Appellant’s
brief, p. 8.) This theory finds no support in the record, however, because Timpson never
made this claim to the district court. Timpson did not present an affidavit. He cites no
legal standard for “verifying” a brief in response to a notice of intent to dismiss. He has
failed to show error by the district court.
The district court also concluded that, even if the factual claims in the reply were
considered it did not rise to the level of showing that the Rule 35 motion would have had
merit. (R., p. 90, 98-99.) The court concluded that “the motion would have been futile”
because, even in the best light for Timpson, “the provided information does not render his
sentence excessive.” (R., pp. 98-99.) Timpson’s arguments notwithstanding (Appellant’s
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brief, pp. 10-11), the court’s determination that the motion would not have been granted
was a proper basis for summary dismissal of the claim. State v. Dunlap, 155 Idaho 345,
385, 313 P.3d 1, 41 (2013) (“the critical inquiry” for summary dismissal of a claim of
ineffective assistance of counsel for failing to file a motion “is whether the motion, if filed,
should have been granted”); see
also -----Schoger, 148 Idaho at 630, 226 P.3d at 1277; Hairston,
- --133 Idaho at 512, 988 P.2d at 1186.
Finally, the state asserts as an alternative argument that the claim should have been
dismissed on the purely legal ground that Timpson did not have a constitutional right to
counsel to pursue a motion for reconsideration. There is “no statutory or constitutional
right to effective assistance of post-conviction counsel.” Murphy v. State, 156 Idaho 389,
395, 327 P.3d 365, 371 (2014); -see --also --------------Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U.S. 722, 752 (1991)
(“There is no constitutional right to an attorney in state post-conviction proceedings.”);
Pennsylvania v. Finley, 481 U.S. 551, 555-57 (1987).

The Sixth Amendment only

guarantees a criminal defendant the right to counsel during “critical stages” of the
adversarial proceedings against him. Estrada v. State, 143 Idaho 558, 562, 149 P.3d 833,
837 (2006) (citing United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218, 224 (1967); State v. Ruth, 102
Idaho 638, 637 P.2d 415 (1981)). Although this right encompasses the first direct appeal,
it does not extend to post-conviction proceedings. Lawrence v. Florida, 549 U.S. 327, 33637 (2007); Finley, 481 U.S. at 555. “The determination whether [a] hearing is a ‘critical
stage’ requiring the provision of counsel depends … upon an analysis ‘whether potential
substantial prejudice to defendant’s rights inheres in the *** confrontation and the ability
to help avoid that prejudice.’” Coleman v. Alabama, 399 U.S. 1, 9 (1970) (asterisks
original, quoting Wade, 388 U.S. at 227).
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A motion to reconsider the sentence is not a critical stage of the proceedings for
purposes of the right to counsel. United States v. Jackson, 923 F.2d 1494, 1496-97 (11th
Cir. 1991). This is because a Rule 35 motion can “only benefit the defendant by reducing
his sentence which had already become final.” United States v. Taylor, 414 F.3d 528, 537
(4th Cir. 2005). There is, therefore, no Sixth Amendment right to counsel on a Rule 35
motion. Taylor, 414 F.3d at 537; United States v. Paloma, 80 F.3d 138, 142 (5th Cir. 1996).
Where a defendant has no constitutional right to the effective assistance of counsel, a
defendant cannot be deprived of that right. Wainwright v. Torna, 455 U.S. 586, 587-88
(1982).
Neither the Supreme Court of the United States nor the Idaho courts have
specifically decided whether a defendant has a constitutional right to counsel to pursue a
motion for reconsideration of his sentence. However, as set forth above, Supreme Court
precedent is consistent with that proposition (and was in fact employed in the federal cases
holding that no such right applies). Idaho precedent is also consistent with a defendant not
having a constitutional right to counsel for a post-judgment reconsideration motion. For
example, in Idaho “a post-judgment hearing upon a motion to withdraw a guilty plea is not
a critical stage for purposes of the Sixth Amendment.” State v. Hartshorn, 149 Idaho 454,
458, 235 P.3d 404, 408 (Ct. App. 2010). Although a defendant “has the statutory right to
counsel at all critical stages of the criminal process, including pursuit of a Rule 35 motion”
State v. Smith, 161 Idaho 162, 164, 384 P.3d 409, 411 (Ct. App. 2016) (emphasis added),
that right is more limited than the constitutional right to counsel because “a defendant may
be denied appointment of counsel to assist in pursuing a Rule 35 motion if the trial court
finds the motion to be frivolous.” State v. Wade, 125 Idaho 522, 523–24, 873 P.2d 167,
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168–69 (Ct. App. 1994). Because an Idaho court may deny appointment of counsel to
pursue a frivolous Rule 35 motion, there is no reason to believe a Sixth Amendment right
exists.
Timpson is asserting a non-existent Sixth Amendment right to effective assistance
of counsel to pursue a post-judgment motion to reconsider the sentence. Because this claim
fails as a matter of law, and because it is unsupported by evidence and because the motion
would not have been granted, the district court correctly dismissed the petition.

CONCLUSION
The state respectfully requests this Court to affirm the district court’s summary
dismissal of the petition for post-conviction relief.

DATED this 21st day of May, 2018.

_/s/ Kenneth K. Jorgensen_______________
KENNETH K. JORGENSEN
Deputy Attorney General

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I HEREBY CERTIFY that I have this 21st day of May, 2018, served a true and
correct copy of the foregoing BRIEF OF RESPONDENT by emailing an electronic copy
to:
REED P. ANDERSON
DEPUTY STATE APPELLATE PUBLIC DEFENDER
at the following email address: briefs@sapd.state.id.us.

_/s/ Kenneth K. Jorgensen______________
KENNETH K. JORGENSEN
Deputy Attorney General
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